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Título: El sujeto en Psicoterapia Cognitiva. 
Resumen: En este trabajo se reflexiona sobre el tipo de sujetos implícitos 
en psicoterapia cognitiva. El modelo cognitivo de Beck, al que podemos 
considerar como un modelo racionalista y modernista, ejemplificará estos 
sujetos. En primer lugar, debemos situar a la terapia cognitiva en un con-
texto histórico y relacionarla con un sujeto caracterizado por poseer racio-
nalidad y la habilidad para observar y detectar cogniciones, emociones y 
conductas. Este trabajo desarrolla todo ello introduciendo tres tipos princi-
pales de sujetos. El primero es el sujeto introspectivo y consciente, que es 
capaz de observar lo que pasa en su interior, tiene acceso libre y es cons-
ciente de su mundo cognitivo. El segundo, el indigente cognitivo, describe 
al tipo de sujeto que entra en psicoterapia cognitiva. El último sujeto identi-
ficado es el científico entrenado que es capaz de desarrollar un conocimien-
to más objetivo, cambiando esquemas disfuncionales y cogniciones distor-
sionadas. Este sujeto es el que se busca en psicoterapia cognitiva. Podemos 
relacionar estos sujetos con algunas de las características principales de la 
terapia cognitiva, como el concepto de ABC, los procedimientos de evalua-
ción, las técnicas cognitivas o la relevancia de los esquemas. Finalmente, el 
trabajo sugiere algunos elementos de estudio que pueden contribuir a la 
evolución teorética y clínica de la psicoterapia cognitiva. 
Palabras clave: Sujeto en psicoterapia cognitiva; introspección; conscien-
cia; indigente cognitivo; científico entrenado. 
  Abstract: This paper discusses the various subjects embedded in cognitive 
psychotherapy. The cognitive model developed by Beck, considered as a 
rationalist and modernist model, will exemplify these subjects.  Cognitive 
therapy should be placed in the modernist historical context and related to 
a subject characterized as having rationality and the ability to observe and 
detect cognitions, emotions and behaviors. The paper develops this back-
ground introducing three main subject types. The first is the introspective 
and conscious subject, who is able to observe what is within oneself, has 
free access, and is conscious of one‟s cognitive world. The second is the 
cognitive miser that describes the subject who enters into therapy. The fi-
nal subject identified, is the trained scientist who is able to develop a more 
objective knowledge, changing faulty schemas and cognitive distortions. 
This subject is the one most looked for in cognitive therapy. We could 
connect these subjects to some of the main elements of cognitive therapy 
such as the concept of ABC, assessment procedures, cognitive techniques 
or the relevance of schemas. Finally, the paper suggests some issues for 
study that could contribute to the theoretical and clinical evolution of cog-
nitive psychotherapy. 
Key words: Cognitive therapy subject; introspection; consciousness; cogni-
tive miser; trained scientist. 
 
     Introduction 
 
This paper discusses an issue that is relevant to the field of 
Psychology and Psychotherapy. Within any psychological 
model it should be understood that there are different and 
implicit types of subjects. From the beginnings of psychoa-
nalysis until the present psychological treatments or perspec-
tives such as cognitive neuroscience, we should emphasize 
the impossibility of understanding psychological models 
without considering the subjects implicit both between and 
within them.  
From an etymological perspective, the word subject 
comes from the Latin word subiectus, meaning, what is under. 
As defined by Danziger, the subject, in a philosophical con-
text, is the source of actions and ideas, an active principle 
(Brock, 2006). Any action belongs to someone (Fierro, 1996; 
Pérez, 2004).  
The main aim of this paper is to address the subject em-
bedded in cognitive or rationalist therapies. The field of 
cognitive psychotherapy is today firmly established and we 
cannot neglect its contribution to the field of psychotherapy. 
However, there are great epistemological, philosophical or 
ontological differences between rationalist and construction-
ist models (Mahoney, 1991; Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987; 
Neimeyer, 1993) or between modernist and postmodernist 
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perspectives (Caro Gabalda, 1995).12 Due to these differ-
ences, this paper focuses, exclusively, on the rationalist or 
modernist model or what can be termed as a classical cogni-
tive model, such as the cognitive restructuring perspective, 
exemplified in Beck‟s model. This model has evolved over 
time, but it maintains its own specific and distinctive issues. 
Our main assumption is that cognitive/rationalist thera-
py has not developed an explicit account regarding the subject 
that this therapy addresses. However, there is a subject im-
plicit in this model, a subject for the different cognitive ac-
tions. We assume that a theoretical examination of the im-
plicit “subject” has implications in terms of a theoretical and 
clinical comprehension of the cognitive restructuring model. 
Before explaining the subject under the cognitive model, 
we need to emphasize some of the main characteristics of 
cognitive psychotherapy, connected with specific actions 
cognitive therapists ask their patients. This will provide the 
required background for the development of the main issues 
of this paper. 
 
What is cognitive therapy? 
 
From the outset, cognitive therapists have offered the limits 
and range of their model (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979; 
Clark, Beck & Alford, 1999; Hollon & Beck, 1994), showing 
a wide range of efficaciousness (Hofman, Asnaani, Vonk, 
                                                          
12Although nobody wants to be considered as a rationalist (Mahoney, 1995), 
we assume that this distinction still makes sense, exemplifying the different 
cognitive perspectives. Clark, Beck & Alford (1999, p. 62) recognized that 
“cognitive theory adopts a realist and modernist epistemology as opposed to 
an antirealist and postmodernist perspective”. 
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Sawyer & Fang, 2012). From a brief general perspective, 
cognitive therapy focuses on our constructions and interpre-
tations of reality: on how we attach meaning to events and 
on the influence of meaning on our mental well-being. From 
the moment that a patient enters into a cognitive therapy 
session, the therapist looks for specific activities or actions, 
playing a guiding role. Cognitive therapists are “teachers” 
and patients are “students” that learn about the influence of 
their worlds of meanings during therapy. In this sense, ther-
apists guide patients toward the discovery of the influence of 
thought on their well-being, right until the outset of therapy 
(Caro Gabalda, 2011). 
Let us take the ABC formulation (Ellis, 1958, 1984) as an 
example. The ABC model is a main focus of Rational-
Emotive-Behavior Therapy, but it is easy to translate and 
generalize it in relation to other cognitive restructuring mod-
els. “A” stands for activating events; “B” for the world of 
beliefs or, for the whole world of our constructions and in-
terpretations; and, finally, “C” stands for emotional and be-
havioral consequences. Patients receive, from their thera-
pists, an explanation of their problems that helps them to 
understand the relevance of the interpretations and con-
structions of their experiences. 
This is tied to the importance of cognitive formulation 
(Persons, 1989; 2008). The patient should look for and “val-
idate” this cognitive formulation, so how patients interpret 
reality has a great relevance. The main therapeutic activity of 
patients is to provide a host of cognitions (also related to 
their emotions and behaviors) that sustain the cognitive 
formulation. The Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts (Burns, 
1980) is an excellent example of this first group of actions.  
This cognitive activity is not only demanded at the be-
ginning but during therapy. Patients should focus actively 
and extensively on their thinking, their cognitions, and on 
how they perceive and interpret situations until the conclu-
sion of therapy. This cognitive process is just the beginning 
of another that is more difficult and personally demanding 
for patients. Patients should act on what has been identified. 
Patients should work extensively with their thinking pro-
cesses and look for a cognitive change, related to becoming 
detached observers from their thoughts, looking for evi-
dence for or against these thoughts to develop an alternative 
thinking and to modify schemas and core beliefs. This is 
usually done in the context of the Socratic dialogue. The 
therapist provides the appropriate climate for this cognitive 
work, emphasizing therapeutic alliance, guided discovery and 
collaborative empiricism. 
These activities and actions belong to a cognitive subject. 
Guided by the above activities and cognitive actions, and by 
some of the main characteristics of cognitive therapy, what 
kind of subject is inferred? We will explain this issue focus-
ing, first, on the implicit subject in the historical context of 
cognitive therapy.  
 
What kind of subject is embedded in cognitive 
therapy?: A historical perspective 
 
As a scientific discipline, psychology was part of a modernist 
tradition (Gergen, 1991, 1992; 2001; Kvale, 1992). We could 
consider psychotherapy as a project of modernity. The main 
modernist trends explain, as a kind of therapy, the classical, 
rationalist cognitive psychotherapies (see, also, Woolfolk & 
Richardson, 1984). Cognitive psychotherapies exemplify all 
the basic elements of “modern times” (Ibáñez, 1993).  
Following Gergen (1992, p. 19) we have to assume that 
the psychological sciences participated in the modernist ro-
mance. Four issues are relevant in this context: (a) belief in a 
knowable world, defending a basic subject matter; (b) belief in 
universal properties that can be discovered in relation to this 
subject matter; (c) belief through method; and finally, (d) be-
lief in the progressive nature of research. Translating this to the 
cognitive therapy field we could assume that cognition, in a 
wide sense, exemplifies the basic subject matter. The influ-
ence of our cognitive world and on how faulty and distorted 
thinking can be modified, via cognitive procedures, is cen-
tral. Based on this subject matter, cognitive therapy aims to 
develop clinical and useful procedures.  
According to Gergen (2001), the modernist tradition 
makes us defend the fact that mental processes are available 
for objective study, and are causally related to environmental 
inputs and to behavioral consequences. The modernist as-
sumptions that Gergen emphasized have striking similarities 
with the cognitive therapy ABC model (see above).  
Cognitive therapy assumes the rational justification of a 
logical empiricist philosophy. The nature of the subject mat-
ter and the causal networks in which it is embedded need to 
be examined, but results from this method are impersonal. 
From research, we obtain value-neutral truths. We should 
develop reliable, valid methods that are “objective”, uncon-
taminated by human wishes, fears, evaluations, values, etc. 
(Christopher, Richardson & Christopher, 2003). The reliance 
on demonstrating the effectiveness of the cognitive model 
(Lyddon & Jones, 2001) exemplifies this. Results could be 
objective and valid when the method used has followed reli-
able and proper guidelines. 
 
The Cartesian, modernist subject 
 
As Rosenau (1992) stated the subject is a symbol of mo-
dernity. We could relate this modernist scientific context to 
a particular perspective on human subjects. A perspective 
which cognitive therapy inherited as part of its modernist 
background, and which is shown in its therapeutic concep-
tualization and formulation of clinical cases and therapeutic 
procedures. 
Classical cognitive therapies are structured around a Car-
tesian subject. We could consider human beings, therefore, as 
atomistically discrete centres of experience and action 
(Christopher et al., 2003).  This subject is a unified, mono-
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lithic, reified, essentialized, capable of being fully conscious, 
and able to develop a fully rational action (Lather, 1992).  
This type of discussion regarding the human subject de-
rives from the thinking of Descartes. In the Second Meditation 
Descartes asked:  
What am I then? A thing which thinks. What is that? A thing which 
doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, is unwilling, and also imagines 
and feels ( Cottingham, 1978, p. 208). 
Based on Foucault (1975) we could translate the modern 
self and its relationships to the social scientist that develops 
techniques to observe, measure, predict and control a sub-
ject‟s behavior, to the cognitive therapy field. The most rele-
vant characteristic of this modernist self is self-
consciousness (Caro Gabalda, 2003). The Cartesian view 
implies distancing and reflexivity. In this last sense, the “co-
gito” is the basis for all knowledge (Pérez, 2012). 
This conceptualization makes us certain of the existence 
of my mind (Seoane, 2005). The subject has authority over 
consciousness materials, “an authority which has its basis in 
the concepts of reason, logic and truth” (Lather, 1992, p. 
121). Reason and observation are key elements of the mod-
ernist, rationalist subject (Gergen, 1991).23Self-reflection 
makes us feel secure, but, then, the self is separated from the 
material world and from history, and becomes an isolated 
individual that must conquer unknown territories (Seoane, 
2005). 
Cognitive therapy exemplifies the modernist, rationalist 
subject, defending a human being that becomes both, object 
and subject. Object because the subject matter, as we have pre-
viously stated, is the whole patient‟s cognitive world, and 
subject because the patient is the direct agent of the cognitive 
change (Caro Gabalda, 2003). 
The subject behind these cognitive models will be a cen-
tral homunculus that construes reality, reacting to an exter-
nal reality. The homunculus could be considered an unpro-
ductive and paradoxical idea (Minsky, 1985) and there is a 
lack of agreement about it, for instance, in the field of cogni-
tive sciences (Baddeley, 1998; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Par-
kin, 1998). However, some kind of central agent could be 
seen embedded in this perspective. Humans are rational be-
ings, whose behavior is a consequence of how they pay at-
tention, observe the world, and adapt to it (Gergen, 1991). 
This central homunculus is relevant for the understanding of 
the perspective of cognitive psychotherapy. There are ab-
stract characteristics of the human being, referred to as 
schemas, cognitive distortions, faulty information pro-
cessing, that a central agent coordinates and modifies. This 
central agent needs to discover the patient‟s inner world, 
make sense of it and reconstruct it.  
                                                          
23A note of caution should be considered here as this is not the only way to 
consider human rationality. We have followed a psychological and therapeu-
tic perspective on human rationality, based on our understanding of a cogni-
tive restructuring perspective, but this rational subject could have a different 
basis if we explore other fields. From an economical point of view, for in-
stance, the human being is a “Homo oeconomicus”. Following Shirrmacher 
(2014), human beings are rational when they look for their benefit being co-
herent with their own rules. 
The therapist addresses this kind of individual just de-
scribed. Although this subject is not explicitly recognized or 
elaborated on, we need for our therapeutic work an acting, 
rational subject. The cognitive subject uses rationality to un-
derstand and deal with his or her problems. Human beings 
are able to get a true understanding of themselves and their 
worlds. This understanding is the basis for rational belief 
and action (Martin & Sugarman, 2000). 
In cognitive models, the information obtained from our 
experiences has a hierarchical structure. Our experiences are 
passive, subjected to codification, storage, retrieval and 
modification due to previous knowledge structures. This re-
quires, according to Osatuke et al. (2005) a central agent in 
charge of retrieving and applying relevant information. This 
corresponds to what Fay (1987, cited in Lather, 1992, p. 102) 
calls a “metaphysics of human agency”, that is, “an inflated 
conception of the powers of human reason and will”. 
For development of this modernist, rationalist subject, 
we need to answer the following question: as therapists what 
do we expect from the patient treated under a rationalist 
model? To answer this, we need to consider three types of 
subjects under this cognitive therapy model. These three 
subjects develop, we could assume, the rationalist or mod-
ernist subject just described. The first is the introspective 
and conscious subject able to get free “access” to his or her 
cognitive world. The second is the subject as a cognitive mi-
ser, in a critical sense, which explains what the patient does 
and, consequently, his/her psychopathology. Finally, we will 
focus on the subject as a trained scientist; the subject looked 
for or addressed in cognitive therapy. 
 
The introspective and conscious subject 
 
We could understand patients‟ problems through different 
cognitive structures and processes behind their affective, 
motivational, behavioral and cognitive symptoms. The indi-
vidual is similar to or identified with the functioning of the 
mind. The patient in front of the therapist is identified with 
what he/she is thinking. In cognitive therapy, we deal with a 
thinking subject. For this reason, the subject should be able 
to get a free and privileged access to his or her thinking pro-
cesses. 
The history of Psychology has focused extensively on in-
trospection. A detailed review is not appropriate here, but 
there are classical (Danziger, 1980; Pinillos, 1983) or more 
recent descriptions (Costall, 2006) regarding the role and his-
tory of introspection in Psychology. William James (1890) 
defined introspection as “looking into our own minds and 
reporting what we there discover” (p. 185). What we discov-
er, then, are states of consciousness. Unfortunately, as we do not 
have a psychocospe (Pinillos, 1983), we need to have “some-
thing” that allows us to get access to our cognitive therapy 
materials. If we talk about introspection we have to remem-
ber what James (1884) said when he advised us about the 
differences “between the immediate feltness of a mental state 
and its perception by a subsequent act of reflection” (p.1). 
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A more recent consideration emphasizes that introspec-
tion “involves an attending to the content of one‟s con-
sciousness and nothing more than that” (Overgaard, 2006, p. 
631). 
Consciousness, therefore, is also relevant to the field of 
cognitive therapy. According to Frith and Rees (2007) cogni-
tive therapy uses the term “cognitive” for referring to 
knowledge, beliefs and attitudes which are key components 
of consciousness. As Tye (2007) assumed, our mental states 
cannot fail to be conscious. Even if one does not know how 
the process has been produced, there is a consciousness, 
therefore, of different things such as the noises on the street 
and the sweet memories of the past. Consciousness, as well 
as introspection, is a complex phenomenon both for philos-
ophy and for psychology (Robinson, 2010), and difficult to 
define (Frith & Rees, 2007). As Pinillos (1983) said: “con-
sciousness is eluding, it avoids definition, and, obviously, is 
not a public matter; two centuries of philosophical inquiries 
and one century of scientific psychology has not unveiled its 
face” (p. 12). 
According to Lambie and Marcel (2002), psychologists 
use consciousness, first as awareness, a kind of knowing (by 
acquaintance), a second order awareness or reflexive con-
sciousness. Secondly, consciousness refers to phenomenolo-
gy (what it’s like) or first order phenomenal experience. 
A classical paper from Radford (1974) distinguished be-
tween the ranges of activities of subjects that could be con-
sidered as introspection. Subjects could self-observe their men-
tal events, reporting their experiences. Secondly, subjects 
could recount their experiences, that is, self-report, but with-
out trying to be objective. Cognitive therapy acknowledges 
both of them. For example, Beck (1976) said:”... he can use, 
with the proper instruction, to deal with these disturbing el-
ements in his consciousness... Man has the key to understanding 
and solving his psychological disturbance within the scope of his own 
awareness” (p. 3) (italics in original); or later on “...since cog-
nitive phenomena are readily observable by the patient 
through introspection” (p. 4). Introspection is so important 
that “cognitive techniques are most appropriate for people 
who have the capacity for introspection and for reflecting 
about their own thoughts and fantasies” (Beck, 1976, p. 
216). 
In cognitive therapy, patients are encouraged to focus on 
many different things: the situation they are experiencing, 
how it is constructed, and the kind of emotions and behav-
iors involved. Patients self-observe themselves and inform 
others by written and verbal communication. Therapists use 
self-reporting measures for identifying automatic thoughts, 
their underlying schemas and the corresponding cognitive 
distortions (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2005).  
There is a third activity according to Radford (1974): 
thinking aloud, that could be found in cognitive therapy, or 
therapy in general, if we consider those instances where pa-
tients are focused on a particular situation and encouraged 
to think aloud about what they feel, experience or think re-
garding a particular situation (Dunkley, Blankstein & Segal, 
2010). Although we cannot directly compare cognitive ther-
apy work to the classical and present experimental and re-
search traditions that focus on introspection and conscious-
ness (see, for instance, issues of journals such as Consciousness 
and Cognition and the Journal of Consciousness Studies) we believe 
that two of the most relevant activities of the cognitive ther-
apy subject are introspection and consciousness. 
Introspection and consciousness form the basis of the 
assessment of the cognitive world. This is evident when pa-
tients are in the process of a clinical interview, or simply an-
swering a therapist‟s question such as “What goes through 
your mind when you are feeling sad?” To ask patients about 
what goes through their minds is one of the simplest meth-
ods to detect automatic thoughts. This introspective ques-
tioning is encouraged during or outside of a session, but the 
cognitive process depends on the patients‟ ability to have a 
conscious access to the cognitive material (Yurica & DiTo-
masso, 2005). Furthermore, when patients are answering a 
rating scale, this reflects a minimal and abbreviated act of in-
trospection (Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011). 
Cognitive assessment depends, mainly, on self-reports. 
Patients report their thinking and their problems in a struc-
tured, unstructured, concurrent or retrospective way 
(Dunkley, Blankstein & Segal, 2010). Books on cognitive as-
sessment skip the issue of introspection and consciousness. 
The question, often asked, “can patients have a “true” ac-
cess to their minds?” is not addressed in the cognitive thera-
py field, although cognitive assessment tasks of any kind rely 
on this access. The classical paper from Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) is an example of the difficulties subjects have getting 
access to how their minds work. However, reflecting on this 
issue from an epistemological perspective, Goldman (2004) 
assumed that “introspection is accepted as an evidential 
source by most epistemologists. In making this acceptance, 
epistemologists go along with people‟s general disposition to 
form beliefs about their current mental states (sensations, 
propositional attitudes, emotions) based on their „awareness‟ 
of these occurrences. Self-awareness or introspection is the 
source that confers a prima facie- warrant on these beliefs” (p. 
4). 
 Of additional interest is the treatment that cognitive 
therapists give to introspection in terms of data and method 
(Radford, 1974). Cognitive therapy assumes a Cartesian 
point of view that considers introspection as direct and in-
corrigible (Costall, 2006) so that the individual knows his or 
her mind better than anyone else does (Gillespie, 2006). The 
Cartesian rationalist subject, again, appears to explain some 
of the main premises of cognitive therapy.  
The consequence of introspection as data and as method 
reflects a belief in the “accuracy” of the patients‟ inner view 
of their cognitive world. Both, patients and therapists took 
at face value the results of introspection and of conscious-
ness. Answers to questionnaires (for instance, the BDI) or 
the filling out of homework assignments such as the Daily 
Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts reflect what is going on. Even 
emotional experiences (at least, before therapy) have phe-
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nomenological “truth” for cognitive therapy (Lambie & 
Marcel, 2002). 
Through introspection, patients will offer a „testimony‟ 
(Goldman, 2004, p. 6) of their cognitive and emotional 
world. For cognitive therapy, we could have access and 
measure cognition. Although it is not assumed that all cogni-
tive activity is fully conscious, deliberate, effortful or a con-
trolled processing (Clark, 1995). We should recognize that 
cognitive therapists are not so naive as to think that intro-
spective data and procedures, and conscious access, reflect 
all that is “within” patients‟ minds or that patients could be 
conscious of all the cognitive processes. However, the 
treatment that therapists give to introspective activities and 
their consequences make us consider and revalidate the con-
ceptualization noted above under the Cartesian view. Pa-
tients‟ self-reports are a „testimony‟ (Goldman, 2004) of 
something “true”. Unfortunately, there is no reflection on 
the issue that when subjects attend to something, this affects 
and creates experiential content (Marcel, 2003). We could 
assume that patients‟ accounts are incomplete, and that the 
therapist‟s task is to help the patient “to peel the onion”. In 
this sense, we cannot forget, as James poetically said, that, 
“our mental life, is like a bird‟s life, and seems to be made up 
of an alternation of flights and perchings” (James, 1884, p.2). 
Let us assume that cognitive assessment relates more to 
retrospection than with observation, which is closer to the 
Jamesian perspective on introspection (James, 1890). We are 
not making the point that cognitive work reflects an intro-
spective kind of psychology; only that, in therapy, we should 
take into account introspection and consciousness. They are 
useful tools for therapists. 
To conclude, the cognitive therapy model acknowledges 
but does not fully discuss the capacity of access, of intro-
spection and consciousness. It is considered as something 
subjects possess, although individual differences should be 
recognized. It is assumed, also, that subjects are able to re-
flect on different issues, which are used to make sense about 
what is happening. The content, the process and the aim of 
cognitive therapies require a conscious and introspective 
human being. The following two perspectives on the cogni-
tive subject depend on this. 
 
The cognitive miser subject: what is wrong 
within this subject? 
 
Early cognitive psychology approaches emphasized the ra-
tionality of human beings and their ability to function as sci-
entists (Seoane, 1982). However, it was emphasized later on 
that this perspective did not give a proper account of human 
beings. The metaphor of human beings as scientists was dis-
carded in favour of the cognitive miser.  
The term cognitive miser comes from the field of social 
cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Garzón, 1984). From this 
framework, Operario and Fiske (1999) describe subjects as 
not thinking rationally or carefully, taking instead cognitive 
shortcuts (e.g., heuristics, schemas, attributions, etc.). For 
this approach, subjects are well-adapted perceivers who sac-
rifice accuracy (i.e., a careful and planned thinking) for efficiency 
by using schemas, scripts, and any kind of simplifying per-
ceptual strategies. These categories could be considered effi-
cient ways of thinking. The subject does not think like a sci-
entist, as described below, does not carefully analyse reality, 
and is unable to reach a weighted evaluation of the data. The 
individual is lazy, a mental sluggard and a cognitive miser 
(Bargh, 1999; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Rodríguez, 1993). 
The reliance of Beck‟s model upon the schema concept 
(see, for instance, Clark et al., 1999) allows us to use the 
metaphor of the cognitive miser in the cognitive therapy 
field. Moss and DiCaccavo (2005) point out that the cogni-
tive miser is one of the most influential models of the sche-
ma function. “The main premise here is that schemata are 
used as heuristics to reduce an individual‟s overall processing 
load. Schemata guide information processing to preferential-
ly encode and assimilate schema consistent information” 
(Moss & DiCaccavo, op. cit., p. 512). 
Although under this perspective individuals are well-
adapted perceivers, cognitive therapy assumes a quite differ-
ent perspective. For cognitive therapy, these shortcuts could 
be non-adaptive and dysfunctional. The subject will resem-
ble, perhaps, more a cognitive monster (Bargh, 1999). The indi-
vidual is unable to process all the information and needs to 
use several structures (such as core beliefs, schemas, etc.) to 
facilitate this task (efficiency and cognitive facilities) but this 
has emotional consequences. These shortcuts favour a cog-
nitive vulnerability or a stress-diathesis model (see for in-
stance, Dozois & Beck, 2008) which is unavoidable and non-
adaptive. 
Within a therapeutic context, therapists have in front of 
them an individual with a limited processing capacity that 
uses unscientific, although effective strategies. From this 
framework, the individual is degraded in the hierarchy of 
knowledge (separated from genuine scientific knowledge). 
The individual is thrown out of the wisdom paradise. People 
do not function as scientists, but use tricks, strategies, heu-
ristics, previous beliefs, etc. (Seoane, 1982), or dysfunctional 
schemas and distorted cognitive processes in the cognitive 
restructuring therapy field. We may assume this is an appro-
priate perspective to understand some characteristics of the 
cognitive therapy subject. We will now develop the above is-
sues in relation to the role of schema in cognitive therapy. 
 
The schema in cognitive therapy 
 
Beck (1964; Beck et al., 1979) introduced his theory in 
relation to the concept of schema for explaining patterns of 
thinking in depression. For Beck (1964): “a schema is con-
ceived of as a structure used for screening, coding and eval-
uating impinging stimuli (p.562)”....; “... the schema abstracts 
and molds the raw data into thoughts or cognitions”. 
A schema is a stable pattern that enables us to give 
meaning to situations and decide what to do. Schemas could 
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be functional and adaptive. As a cognitive miser subject, the pa-
tient could use schemas to interpret and predict information 
quickly. The subject, therefore, does not need to use a great 
amount of mental processing capacity to deal with the de-
mands of a situation (James, Southam & Blackburn, 2004). 
However, problems arise if schemas are pervasive and 
hypervalent. According to the cognitive model, in psycho-
pathological conditions, schemas tend to be hypervalent and 
dysfunctional. In depression, for instance, dysfunctional 
schemas become more and more active, and patients lose 
control over them. The cognitive organization of patients 
becomes fully autonomous and patients are unable to use 
more functional schemas (Beck, et al., 1979). 
The efficient cognitive processor, therefore, is no longer 
efficacious and needs to work with his/her schemas in order 
to achieve a clinical change. However, as far as the therapeu-
tic perspective on schemas is concerned, we should empha-
size that the cognitive miser needs guidance and redirection. 
Anything that has become autonomous needs recognition 
and modification following specific cognitive therapeutic 
strategies. More time needs to be spent finding out what is 
behind our cognitive world, since shortcuts are no longer ef-
ficacious? This is related, obviously, to cognitive formula-




We could see the above ideas, in cognitive therapy case 
formulation, one of the main cognitive therapeutic strategies 
(Persons, 1989, 2008). The case formulation implies the un-
derstanding, conceptualization and formulation of patients‟ 
problems related to the reliance on self-schemas, maladap-
tive beliefs and assumptions, negative automatic thoughts, 
dysfunctional thinking, etc., that should, therefore, be de-
tected. This formulation facilitates planning the appropriate 
intervention. The cognitive miser subject is using automatic 
cognitive strategies but in a dysfunctional, non-adaptive way.  
As early as 1964, Beck said, “The affective response is deter-
mined by the way an individual structures his experience” (p. 567, 
italics in original), and that depends on the elicited schema. 
In this sense, the psychological substrate of depression is re-
lated to the cognitive triad, the role of schemas, and finally 
to the role of the faulty information processing based on 
cognitive errors (Beck, et al., 1979). Psychopathology is re-
lated to dysfunctional beliefs, meanings and memories and 
with specific biases that influence how we process infor-
mation (Beck & Dozois, 2011).  
Therapy participants should acknowledge those struc-
tures and processes as well as the distorted cognitive content 
in an atmosphere of collaborative empiricism (Beck, et al., 1979) 
that requires the active participation and collaboration, of 
both patients and therapists. Although the atmosphere is 
one of collaboration and therapeutic alliance, the role of the 
therapist is similar to the role of a teacher, while the patients‟ 
role is similar to a student. Patients attend therapy to “learn” 




Cognitive techniques also reflect the relevance for cognitive 
psychotherapy of detecting those cognitive shortcuts that 
represent the faulty patient‟s cognitive world. “Cognitive 
techniques consist of: .... a microscopic or cross-sectional 
approach, focused on recognizing and evaluating specific 
cognitions; and the identification and modification of the 
misconceptions, superstitions, and syllogisms that lead to 
maladaptive reactions” (Beck & Alford, 2009, pp. 307-308). 
Cognitive handbooks describe different cognitive tech-
niques (Beck, et al., 1979; Caro Gabalda, 2011). A relevant 
aspect shown in most of them is how the main aim of the 
various techniques is the modification of faulty thinking, and 
in addition, the discovery of dysfunctional thinking process-
es and patterns.  
For instance, the detection of automatic thoughts looks 
for how these thoughts reflect dysfunctional cognitions. 
These automatic thoughts and images should be corrected 
by examining them empirically and testing, in real life, their 
validity. The search for alternative solutions aims to identify 
rigid patterns and topics in patients‟ thinking. The Daily Rec-
ord of Dysfunctional Thoughts is a good reminder of patients‟ 
thinking mistakes and of how these maintain psychopathol-
ogy. The detection of cognitive errors is a key issue in cogni-
tive treatment. Through techniques such as the downward 
arrow or other techniques, we could identify schemas and 
core beliefs.  
At this point, another metaphor comes into the arena: the 
subject as a trained scientist. We would like to assume that we 
have to differentiate between the individual that enters ther-
apy, i.e., the cognitive miser that knows, constructs and un-
derstands, and the individual that wants to improve his or 
her knowledge and understanding. This subject is welcomed 
and looked for in therapy. 
 
Obtaining the therapeutic aims: the subject as 
a trained scientist 
 
Although Beck has insisted, from the very beginning, that 
his work is based on an information processing approach 
(Clark, et al., 1999), this adscription seems to be more nomi-
nal than sound (Brewin, 1989; Caro Gabalda, 2013; Dowd, 
2002; Ibáñez, 1990). 
The information processing approach relied extensively 
on the computer metaphor. For de Vega (1982) the human 
mind and the computer are processing systems, functionally 
equivalent. Based on Turings‟ universal machine this analogy is 
functional instead of physical. What is relevant is the software 
not the hardware. The computer should be able not only to 
simulate what a human being “does”, but it should be able to 
simulate what a human being “is able to do” (Delclaux, 1982). 
The metaphor of a naive scientist is characteristic of this 
field and assumes that the individual codifies, stores, trans-
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forms and retrieves information (abstract symbol lists with-
out content). Here we are referring to the study of processes 
and structures, neutral, cold, empty of content and free of 
motivational and affective information elements (Seoane, 
1982). 
From this perspective, people‟s perceptions and daily in-
teractions relate to testing lay hypotheses about the social 
world. Lay perceivers, therefore, proceed in a careful and 
planned manner when they try to discover their own and 
other‟s behavioral causes. Based on inferential, quasi-
scientific processes, people judge, develop intentions, and 
make behaviors (Operario & Fiske, 1999). This perspective 
could be problematic. The human subject becomes a ma-
chine that operates and acts upon an input, in order to pro-
duce an output. In this context, the subject is an active one, 
but not a subject of knowledge (Seoane, 1985). The infor-
mation processing conception is seen as empty of content 
and affect (Seoane, 1982), which could be problematic for a 
therapy, such as the cognitive model.  
Nevertheless, according to Gergen (1991), diverse cogni-
tive therapies apply the computer metaphor. We partly agree 
with Gergen. If we assume the existence of thinking struc-
tures, human beings could be similar to sophisticated ma-
chines. However, if patients are cognitive misers that need 
guidance towards a better understanding, we should consid-
er them as defective machines that need to be carefully re-
paired. However, as we mentioned above, if we take into ac-
count the cognitive therapy work we could assume that the 
subject should function as a scientist (see Kelly, 1955). We 
should establish a difference between three main issues: 1) 
the conceptualization and formulation of patient‟s problems, 
2) how patients enter therapy as cognitive misers, and, 3) how 
patients should “dress” during treatment. As in the classical 
Saint-Exupery‟s tale, The Little Prince (1943), the metaphor of 
the scientist is related to the kind of dress the patient should 
wear in therapy: the patient should “dress” as a respectful 
and clever scientist that follows and answers the therapist‟s 
challenge for developing a more valid and improved 
knowledge. 
The scientist metaphor is useful only to understand the 
aims of cognitive techniques. Briefly, the therapist aims to 
help patients detect what is wrong, following a certain logical 
order by analysing, looking at the advantages and disad-
vantages, considering alternatives, and checking all this in re-
al life. This will produce an adequate output, that is, an alter-
native valid thinking that reflects reality. Distorted thoughts 
are similar to hypotheses that should be empirically verified. 
If there is evidence, the idea is supported, if not it should be 
rejected. Instead of a naive scientist, the cognitive patient 
becomes a trained scientist.  
The therapist educates patients to become scientists and 
in doing so several issues have to be emphasized. First, that 
therapists use a particular style, the Socratic dialogue. Second-
ly, patients learn, through the different techniques, how to 
modify their distorted thinking, validating alternative conclu-
sions. Finally, patients become rational subjects. 
Socratic dialogue: The context for becoming a sci-
entist 
 
There is some controversy about what is implicit under 
the heading of the Socratic dialogue or Socratic questioning 
(Carey & Mullan, 2004). 
As Freeman (2005) explained, the Socratic dialogue is 
not a discussion or a debate. “The dialogue components of 
Socratic dialogue use a questioning format to facilitate the 
patient‟s movement toward greater recognition of areas, is-
sues, and situations that cause difficulty” (Freeman, op. cit., 
p. 380). Through a process of guided discovery, patients are 
able to find and challenge their faulty conclusions (DeRu-
beis, Webb, Tang & Beck, 2010). This challenge relies, very 
often, on the quest for evidence. 
According to Beck and Alford (2009), the Socratic dia-
logue facilitates the therapist in providing the patient with a 
context to internalize the cognitive perspective. This is pos-
sible in a context of collaboration, in a supportive-direct 
manner, which helps patients to look for the evidence or 
lack of evidence for their beliefs and thoughts. The patients 
functioning as scientists learn, first, how to identify and 
question their beliefs and thoughts, in the context of the 
therapeutic sessions and the Socratic dialogue. The aim is to 
provide patients with a framework to work on their own 
thinking. Cognitive therapy work does not end with the 
therapy sessions but the patient applies it repeatedly, when-
ever he/she needs to. Patients, as trained scientific subjects, 
learn how to observe, detect, question and modify their 
thinking. They put into practice the ideal of the modernist 
self, explained above. The rationale of cognitive techniques 
and the Socratic dialogue, exemplify, also, some of the main 
actions of the subject undergoing cognitive therapy. 
 
Cognitive therapy techniques 
 
In one of the first books discussing his approach, Beck 
(1976) introduced some epistemological principles that clear-
ly reminds us of some of the activities of the scientific sub-
ject. For Beck (op. cit., pp. 233-234) in order to correct their 
distortions, patients need to learn, (a) that the perception of 
reality is not reality itself3;4(b) that their interpretations are 
based on fallible cognitive processes; and, finally, (c) that 
they should be able to test hypotheses, validating them 
through getting information and data. 
These issues are particularly relevant in the context of 
cognitive therapy techniques. As a scientist, the cognitive 
therapy subject looks for evidence. We are not implying that 
cognitive therapy is exclusively based on reality-testing, but 
that looking for evidence is one of the best ways to modify 
distorted thinking and, in this sense, it is used extensively in 
                                                          
34This reminds us of one of the core issues of the theory of General Seman-
tics developed by A. Korzybski and considered as an antecedent of cognitive 
psychotherapies (Caro Gabalda, 1996, 2001, 2014; Mahoney, 1991; Meich-
enbaum, 1977). The general semantics assumption is that “the map is not 
the territory”, or “we cannot identify words with facts” (Korzybski, 1933). 
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cognitive therapy techniques. All of the most relevant cogni-
tive techniques employ this reality testing. For instance, to 
modify automatic thoughts or basic schemas and beliefs, pa-
tients should weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of 
maintaining them, examining and looking for the evidence 
for and against each thought, belief or schema (Beck et al., 
1979; Blackburn, Davidson & Kendell, 1990). 
Cognitive therapy uses also, behavioral techniques to al-
leviate symptoms directly, or to aid cognitive change. Beck 
et al. (1979) emphasized that “... behavioral methods can be 
regarded as a series of small experiments designed to test the 
validity of the patient‟s hypotheses or ideas about himself” 
(p. 118) ....”behavior change is important insofar as it pro-
vides an opportunity for the patient to evaluate empirically 
his ideas of inadequacy and incompetence” (p. 119). 
Although the scientific context is different from the clin-
ical session the use of experiments closely reminds us of the 
role of experiments in a scientific milieu (Bennett-Levy, et 
al., 2004). For Padesky (2004) behavioral experiments are the 
crossroads of cognitive therapy, exemplifying the empirical 
nature of cognitive therapy. 
 
A scientist and rational subject 
 
The trained scientist that tests and validates beliefs based 
on empirical evidence, is a good example. This subject caus-
es us to return to this rationalist perspective in cognitive 
therapy that develops from the modernist subject. From an 
epistemological framework (see Mahoney, 1991, Table 9.3, pp. 
241-244) rationalism implies that knowledge is authorized as 
valid by logic or reason, and that reality is revealed via the 
senses. Patients should validate their knowledge. This is pos-
sible when patients make accurate copies that correspond to 
the “real world” (nature of representation) using “higher” intel-
lectual processes that can and should direct feelings and 
emotions. 
Although rationality is a matter of degree, and thinking 
could improve in many ways outside the therapist‟s office, 
cognitive therapy implies teaching patients how to think 
more rationally by looking for evidence of choices, hypothe-
ses or personal goals regarding their problems (Baron, Bar-
on, Barber & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).  
This rational framework does not only imply a subject 
who looks for evidence, validating knowledge, but a prima-
cy, i.e., one of the consequences of this rationalist perspec-
tive is the reliance on “thinking” over “feeling”. For Beck 
(1976), there is an essential relationship between the content 
of the interpretation of an event and a specific emotional re-
sponse. 
The primacy of reason over emotion has been a matter 
of controversy in the cognitive therapy field in particular 
(Mahoney, 1980; Safran & Segal, 1990; also see Beck, 1996), 
and in psychotherapy in general (Ávila Espada, 2003; 
Greenberg, 2012). A great deal of the standard and classical 
cognitive therapy work relies and focuses on thinking pro-
cesses, on “higher” intellectual processes as the way to get 
meaningful clinical changes (Mahoney, 1991). The rationalist 
subject observes, detects faulty thinking processes and ap-
plies different formulae to get a more valid thinking and 
control of one‟s emotions. 
This is the particular challenge of cognitive therapy with 
respect to the subject in treatment: a challenge that entails 
the movement from the distorted to the rational. In this 
quest, the subject needs to be conscious and introspective 
about one‟s cognitive world, acknowledging cognitive 
shortcuts, developing a more valid knowledge and control-
ling emotions. 
 
Conclusion: implications for cognitive psycho-
therapy 
 
We have tried to show the coherence between some of the 
main elements of cognitive therapy (exemplified through 
Beck‟s model) and three implicit subjects. However, it has to 
be pointed out that these three cognitive subjects are not the 
only possibility in the field of psychotherapy and cognitive 
therapy. Recent reflections, from different perspectives, 
point to different and alternative subject conceptualizations. 
Basically, some of these perspectives centre on the narra-
tive tendency in Psychology, but there are great differences 
between them. This is important, because part of cognitive 
therapy has evolved toward narrativity, defending another 
kind of subject (Bruner, 1986, 2002; Fisher, 1984) and the 
possibility of practicing cognitive therapy under the construc-
tive narrative metaphor (Meichenbaum, 1995). However, other 
perspectives assume (Rosfort & Stanghellini, 2009) that nar-
ratives are not cognitive stories to understand ourselves, 
which is implicit under cognitive therapy narrative perspec-
tives (Gonçalves, 1994). Instead, based on Ricoeur, for in-
stance, a dialectical perspective is defended where narratives 
articulate what the subject knows, and that the self is also a 
person among other persons (Rosfort & Stanghellini, 2009, 
p. 286). To go into detail regarding these different narrative 
subjects would require a separate paper.  
To conclude, this paper has described three main subject 
types, all of them relevant to cognitive therapy work. The 
first is the introspective and conscious subject that reflects basic 
actions for the development of the main activities of cogni-
tive therapy. The widely used metaphor of human beings as 
scientists only partly represents the cognitive subject. We 
need to distinguish, secondly, either between the person that 
enters therapy, a cognitive miser, or at worst, a cognitive monster 
(Bargh, 1999), from the person that leaves therapy as a 
trained scientist. The rationalist, modernist subject embeds 
these three subjects. 
Why should we study the cognitive subject? It will help, 
we assume, to achieve a better understanding of cognitive 
formulation, and cognitive work, from the perspective of the 
therapist and the patient. We suggest that this is important, 
because of the relevance of, and the difficulties for intro-
spection and consciousness. Cognitive therapists are more 
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concerned with showing the effectiveness of their proce-
dures and on assumed and inferred schemas or cognitive 
structures than on the actions of a cognitive subject. That is, 
on the actions of the subject that coordinates these struc-
tures. According to Lambie and Marcel (2002), this could be 
an inheritance of cognitivism and be problematic for a full 
understanding of the subject under treatment. 
Our main tenet is that if we want to contribute with a 
valid therapeutic procedure and improve its effectiveness, 
both for explaining patients‟ problems and for dealing with 
them, we need a theoretical and clinical reflection regarding 
the actions required from the subject of cognitive therapy. 
We could investigate, for instance, how we could facilitate 
our patients‟ access to the content and also to the conse-
quences of their thoughts ?; Is training  necessary to obtain 
this access?; How could therapists  enhance introspection in 
patients who have difficulties using this process?; How could 
therapists help patients to detect what‟s wrong with their 
thinking and to weigh evidence for and against their distorted 
thinking?, At what point should therapists adapt to patients‟ 
introspective capacities?; Do these capacities influence suc-
cess in therapy?; etc. 
We assume that the theory of cognitive therapy cannot 
neglect the issues mentioned in this paper. We suggest that, 
provided cognitive therapy has shown its efficacy and con-
tribution to the field of psychotherapy, studies of these ele-
ments (e.g., regarding the improvement of introspective ca-
pacities and assisting individuals to become better rational 
scientists) will influence, and improve, the theoretical and 
clinical development of cognitive therapy. 
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